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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

EVIDENCE--WITNESSES-JURORS

MAY NOT POSE WRITTEN QUES-

TIONS TO WITNESSES IN CRIMINAL CASES.

Morrison v. State, 845 S.W.2d

882 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)

In 1991, a jury convicted Steven Morrison of murder and assessed a fiftyyear sentence.' During the trial, the judge instructed the jurors that they
could write down any questions they wanted to ask a witness after he or she
had testified.2 If questions were collected, they would be read to the parties
outside the presence of the jury, and the attorneys would have an opportunity to object to the questions.' The judge would then rule on the question,
and depending upon its admissibility, the jurors would be recalled and the
question read to the witness.4 The parties in the case would be allowed to
ask any follow-up questions, provided the questions were limited to the subject matter raised by the juror's question.5
According to the facts, the victim was conducting a drug transaction with
Morrison in the victim's house.6 An argument broke out and Morrison
chased the victim from the house with a butcher's knife.7 At trial, the detective who investigated the murder scene testified that he found blood outside
the victim's house.8 After the detective's testimony, a juror submitted a
question asking: "Was any of the blood in the hall [Morrison's]?" 9 Morrison objected to the question as calling for hearsay.'° Although the objection
was sustained, the juror's question alerted the prosecution that there might
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Morrison v. State, 845 S.W.2d 882, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
Id. at 883 n.1.
Id.
Id.
Morrison, 845 S.W.2d at 883.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 883 n.2.
Id.
Id.
Morrison, 845 S.W.2d at 883 n.2.

10. Id.
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have been a question of whether Morrison's actions were taken in self-defense. The trial judge allowed the State to recall the detective, who was then
questioned as to Morrison's "physical well-being" on the night of the murder."1 He was asked further whether he noticed any "wounds, scratches or
injuries" on Morrison on the night of the murder. 12 The detective responded that he had not noticed any of these conditions.13 Morrison, however, maintained a running objection throughout
the trial to "the process" of
14
questions.
submit
to
jurors
the
allowing
On appeal, the Texas Tenth Court of Appeals refused to ban the practice
of allowing jurors to submit questions, but held that, in Morrison's case,
such practice constituted an improper attorney-juror communication and,
therefore, was reversible error.'5 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
granted Morrison's petition for discretionary review to decide the issue of
whether "the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to recall a
witness to produce evidence on a topic raised by a juror's question."' 6 Held
- reversed. Jurors may not pose written questions to witnesses in criminal
cases. 17
The jury's duty is to ascertain the truth by performing the fact-finding
function.' 8 In medieval times, jurors accomplished this by taking an active
role in producing evidence. '9 In fact, they were generally selected to sit on a
jury because they had knowledge of the particular case at bar.2 ° However,
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Morrison, 845 S.W.2d at 883 n.2.
14. Morrison v. State, 815 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991), afid, 845 S.W.2d
881, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

15. Id. at 768-69.
16. Morrison, 845 S.W.2d at 883.
17. Id. at 884.
18. Harold C. Warner, The Development of Trial by Jury, 26 TENN. L. REV. 459, 459
(1959); see Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fiction?, 21 U. CHI. L. REV.
386, 387-88 n.6 (1954) (stating that resolving fact questions is best left to jury); The JudgeJury Relationship in State Courts, 23 ORE, L. REV. 3, 19 (1943) (discussing inherent difficulties
of juror determination of facts in cosmopolitan society); Lisa M. Harms, Comment, The Questioning of Witnesses by Jurors, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 129 (1977) (discussing need to communicate effectively with jurors to assist them in their duties).
19. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Berkowitz, Note, Breaking the Silence: Should Jurors Be Allowed
To Question Witnesses During Trial?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 117, 122 (1991) (stating that kings
selected jurors because of their ability to discover facts); Jeffrey Reynolds Sylvester, Comment,
Your Honor, May I Ask a Question? The Inherent Dangers of Allowing Jurors to Question
Witnesses, 7 COOLEY L. REV. 214, 214 (1990) (discussing how jurors were instructed to produce factual information and render verdict).
20. See, e.g., Charles T. Coleman, Origins and Development of Trial by Jury, 6 VA. L.
REV. 77, 84 (1919) (discussing selection of juries); Jeffrey S. Berkowitz, Note, Breaking the
Silence: Should Jurors Be Allowed To Question Witnesses During Trial?, 44 VAND. L. REV.
117, 122 (1991) (stating that jurors were selected based on their knowledge of facts of case).
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in the eighteenth century, English and American trials evolved into the modem adversarial-trial system. 2' Jurors were no longer active participants but,
instead, were to act as a neutral and passive body.22 The attorneys had the
duty to present all evidence at trial, while the jury listened to that evidence
and then made a factual determination.23
There has been an impetus, especially in the last few decades, to encourage
jurors to take a more active role and to question witnesses. 24 Two methods
of questioning predominate. First, a juror can directly and orally question
the witness. This method has been rejected by many courts because of the
difficulties posed by having inadmissible evidence elicited and prejudicial effects created when one party openly objects to a juror's question. 25 The second method allows jurors to write down their questions after a witness has
21. See Stephen Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in
Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 572-603 (1990) (describing social
changes that led to development of modem adversarial procedure); Jack Pope, The Jury, 39
TEX. L. REV. 426, 444-47 (1961) (reviewing evolution of adversarial-system juries in colonial
America).
22. See Jack Pope, The ProperFunction ofJurors, 16 BAYLOR L. REV. 365, 366-67 (1962)
(discussing jury's function). In 1905, the Texas Supreme Court explained:
In arriving at a verdict a juror should not indulge in any undue pride of personal opinion,
and he should not be unreasonable or obstinate, and he should give due consideration to
the views and opinions of other jurors, and listen to the arguments with a willingness to be
convinced, and to yield to their views, if induced to believe they are correct; but the law
does not expect, nor does it tolerate, agreement by a juror upon a verdict unless he is
convinced that it is right; in other words, unless it is his verdict, a verdict which his
conscience approves, and he, under oath, after a full consideration to be right.
Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 99 Tex. 337, 337, 90 S.W. 164, 165 (Tex. 1905).
23. See Jack Pope, The ProperFunction of Jurors, 16 BAYLOR L. REV. 365, 366-67 (1962)
(discussing function of jury during trial); 47 AM. JUR. 2D, Jury § 3 (1969) (discussing province
of jury); 50 C.J.S., Juries § 1 (1947) (stating that jury decides factual issues based on issues
presented to it).
24. See Allen v. State, 807 S.W.2d 639, 640-41 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991)
(listing decisions from other jurisdictions adopting jury questioning in past four decades),
rev'd, 1993 WL 13192 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
25. Allen, 807 S.W.2d at 641-42. The court wrote:
Permitting a juror to spontaneously ask a direct oral question of a witness could create
substantial problems as follows:
1. It places counsel "in the intolerable condition of offending the juror by objecting or
permitting improper or impossible prejudicial testimony to come in without objection;"
2. It causes the juror involved to lessen his or her objectivity and causes a premature
judgment on some issue of the case;
3. It produces tension or actual antagonism between the juror and witness as a result
of the interaction.
Id. (citing People v. McAlister, 213 Cal. Rptr. 271, 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)); see Stinson v.
State, 260 S.E.2d 407, 410 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (disapproving of jurors asking direct questions
to witnesses); see also Jeffrey S. Berkowitz, Note, Breaking the Silence: Should Jurors Be Allowed To Question Witnesses During Trial?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 117, 128 (1991) (discussing
state courts' reluctance to allow direct jury questioning).
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been through direct and cross examination. The questions are then read by
the judge outside the jury's hearing, and any party may object. If a question
is deemed admissible, it is read to the witness exactly as written. After all
questions are read to a particular witness, the parties are allowed follow-up
questions on matters raised by the jurors' questions.
Courts and scholars debate the merits of allowing jury questions. Advocates generally cite five reasons for allowing jury questioning. First, such a
system allows jurors to better understand evidence presented to them by permitting them to follow up or clarify evidence presented. 26 Second, jury questioning allows juries to obtain evidence that may have been left out
accidentally by counsel.27 Third, jury questioning more deeply involves the
jury in the trial. 2' Fourth, jury questioning alerts the parties as to what
jurors are thinking, and provides insight into which issues need clarification
or further development.2 9 Last, allowing jury questioning enhances the
jury's confidence in arriving at a verdict.3 0
Opponents of jury questioning contend that there are too many dangers in
allowing this. These dangers include upsetting the adversarial system, 3' dis-

26. See United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
826 (1979) (stating that jurors should be allowed to ask questions if they do not understand
evidence); People v. Heard, 200 N.W.2d 73, 76 (Mich. 1972) (overturning conviction when
judge's preliminary instruction prevented jury questioning because such practice could help
unravel confusing testimony); see also Lisa M. Harms, Comment, The Questioningof Witnesses
by Jurors, 127 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 129-34 (1977) (describing how jury questioning promotes
better understanding by providing for two-way communication between attorney and jurors).
27. Buchanan v. State, 807 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991),
vacated, 1993 WL 37428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Allen, 807 S.W.2d at 642.
28. See Michael J. Wulser, Should JurorsBe Allowed To Ask Witnesses Questionsin Criminal Trials?, 58 UMKC L. REV. 445, 446 (1990) (discussing advantages of allowing jury questioning of witnesses).
29. Buchanan, 807 S.W.2d at 646; Allen, 807 S.W.2d at 642; see Lisa M. Harms, Comment, The Questioning of Witnesses by Jurors, 127 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 129-34 (1977) (elaborating on how jury questioning can aid in two-way communication between attorney and jury).
30. Michael J. Wulser, Should Jurors Be Allowed To Ask Witnesses Questions in Criminal
Trials?, 58 UMKC L. REV. 445, 452 (1990).
31. See C. Randall Michel, Should JurorsBe Allowed To Pose Written Questions to Witnesses During a Trial?, 55 TEX. B.J. 1020, 1020-21 (1992) (discussing arguments against allowing jury questioning). The adversarial system may be affected in several ways:
1) The jury no longer passively listens to the evidence and might become an advocate for one
party. Allen, 807 S.W.2d at 643 (Ellis, J., dissenting).
2) The jury may elicit evidence, which assists the prosecution in a criminal case and, thus,
overcomes the requirement that, for a conviction, the state must produce evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
3) Jurors might have "premature deliberation" when they lose their impartiality by focusing
on answers to their questions without considering other evidence or hearing the judge's
instructions. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, IncreasingJurors' Participationin Trials,
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tracting the jury from the trial or evidence presented, 2 and prejudicing the
jury or the parties. 3 Although many courts have recognized these
problems, 34 all federal 5 and state courts, except Texas courts, that have addressed jury questioning of witnesses, allow it in one form or another.3 6

12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 237 (1988) (discussing potential for evolution of"12 angry men
syndrome").
32. See id. at 237 (stating that jury might upset attorney's strategy of order of presentation of the evidence); H. John Steinbreder, The $10 Billion Misunderstanding,FORTUNE, Dec.
23, 1985, at 6 (discussing how jury questioning in Texaco-Pennzoil case had to be stopped
because it was unreasonably lengthening trial); see also C. Randall Michel, Should Jurors Be
Allowed To Pose Written Questions to Witnesses During a Trial?, 55 TEX. B.J. 1020, 1021
(1992) (stating that jurors might not listen to testimony while thinking of questions to ask
witnesses).
33. See United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 707, 713 (8th Cir. 1989) (Lay, J., dissenting)
(stating that neutrality is disrupted through jury questioning). The Johnson court said:
Allowing juror questioning disrupts juror neutrality, because even a seemingly innocuous
response to a seemingly innocuous juror question can sway the jury's appraisal of the
credibility of the witness, the party, and the case. The factfinder who openly engages in
rebuttal or cross-examination, even by means of a neutral question, joins sides prematurely and potentially closes off its receptiveness to further suggestions of a different outcome for the case. While nothing can assure the jury will remain open-minded to the end,
keeping the jury out of the advocacy process increases the probability.
Id.; cf. STEPHEN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY PROCESS: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 34 (1984) (stating that neutral and passive jury is necessary to avoid prejudice).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Land, 877 F.2d 17, 19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 894
(1989) (expressing reservations on allowing jury questioning but finding it not erroneous);
United States v. Polowikchak, 783 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1986) (allowing jury questioning
even with reservations about its use).
35. United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1123 n.9 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom.
Wellington v. United States, 494 U.S. 1005 (1990); Land, 877 F.2d at 29; DeBenedetto v.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516 (4th Cir. 1985); Callahan, 588 F.2d at
1086; United States v. Gonzalez, 424 F.2d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Witt,
215 F.2d 580, 588 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Talanker v. United States, 348 U.S. 887
(1954).
36. See Allen, 807 S.W.2d at 640-41 (listing all foreign jurisdictions allowing jury questioning). For cases in other jurisdictions adopting jury questioning of witnesses, see State v.
LeMaster, 669 P.2d 592, 598 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (Arizona); Nelson v. State, 513 S.W.2d
496, 498 (Ark. 1974) (Arkansas); McAlister, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 276 (California); Yeager v.
Greene, 502 A.2d 980, 985 (D.C. 1985) (District of Columbia); Ferrara v. State, 101 So. 2d
797, 801 (Fla. 1958) (Florida); Storey v. State, 278 S.E.2d 97, 98 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (Georgia); Carter v. State, 234 N.E.2d 650, 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968) (Indiana); Rudolph v. Iowa
Methodist Medical Ctr., Inc., 293 N.W.2d 550, 555-56 (Iowa 1980) (Iowa); Stamp v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W. 242, 246 (Ky. 1923) (Kentucky); Heard, 200 N.W.2d 73, 75 (Mich.
1972) (Michigan); Sparks v. Daniels, 343 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (Missouri);
State v. Rodriguez, 762 P.2d 898, 901-02 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (New Mexico); People v.
Knapper, 230 A.D. 487, 245 N.Y.S. 245, 251 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930) (New York); State v.
Kendall, 57 S.E. 340, 341 (N.C. 1907) (North Carolina); State v. Sheppard, 128 N.E.2d 471,
499 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955), arid,135 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio 1956) (Ohio); Krause v. State, 132 P.2d
179, 182 (Okla. Crim. 1942) (Oklahoma); Boggs v. Jewel Tea Co., 109 A. 666, 667 (Pa. 1920)
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Texas trial-court judges have wide discretion in conducting the trial.3 7
This must, however, be accomplished in a neutral and unprejudicial manner."8 For instance, a judge may not comment on the weight of the evidence
or question a witness in an partial manner.3 9 Additionally, contrary to all
g°
other jurisdictions, Texas trial judges may not call their own witnesses.
Therefore, Texas courts have had little experimentation with jury questioning. In the 1970s, Judge E.E. Jordan allowed jurors to question witnesses in
various cases. 4t Although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was
presented with the opportunity, it declined to rule directly on jury questioning." Over the last few years, Texas courts, both civil and criminal, have
begun to experiment with jury questioning. This practice has been approved
by several Texas Courts of Appeals as being within the trial court's
discretion.4 3

(Pennsylvania); State v. Barrett, 297 S.E.2d 794, 796 (S.C. 1982) (South Carolina), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1045 (1983); Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) (Tennessee); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1144-45 (Utah 1989) (Utah).
37. See TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 61 l(a) (granting court reasonable control over mode and
order of presenting evidence in civil trials); TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 610(a) (granting court reasonable control over mode and order of presenting evidence in criminal cases); TEX. JUR. 3D,
Trial § 47 (1989) (stating "a judge has great discretion in controlling the trial .... ").
38. See Crawford Chevrolet, Inc. v. McLarty, 519 S.W.2d 656, 664 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1975, no writ)(stating that judges must refrain from making unnecessary comments
or remarks during trial, which might influence jurors).
39. See Hargrove v. Fort Worth Elevator Co., 276 S.W. 426, 427-28 (Tex. Comm'n. App.
1925, holding approved) (finding trial judge's questioning of witness prejudicial in that it influenced jurors by discrediting witness); Kelly Salvage Co. v. Neel, 262 S.W. 189, 189-90 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1924, no writ) (finding judges' questioning of witness deprived party
of fair trial). However, a judge may question witness in an impartial manner in order to clarify
an issue. Brewer v. State, 572 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Munoz v. State, 485
S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
40. See HULEN D. WENDORF ET AL., TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL VI-98
(1991) (stating that Texas has no comparable provision to Federal Rule of Evidence 614,
which allows judge to call witness). Federal Rule of Evidence 614(a) provides: "The court
may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party, call witnesses.
FED. R. EVID.
614(a).
41. See Pless v. State, 576 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (stating that trial court
allowed jurors orally to question witnesses); Carr v. State, 475 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1972) (discussing trial court's allowance of juror questioning).
42. See Pless, 576 S.W.2d at 85 (finding any error concerning trial court's allowing jurors
to question witnesses orally not properly preserved); Carr, 475 S.W.2d at 757 (finding that any
impropriety of trial court's allowance of juror questioning was not preserved by objection).
43. See Morrison v. State, 815 S.W.2d 766, 769 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991), (stating that it
is within trial court's sound discretion whether and how juries question witnesses) affid, 845
S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Velasquez v. State, 815 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (agreeing with analysis that trial judge controls mode of presentation of evidence, thus, allowing judge to permit jury questioning); Allen, 807 S.W.2d at 642
(questioning of witnesses by jurors within trial judge's discretion).
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However, Judge Maloney, writing for the majority opinion in Morrison,
stated that the practice of allowing jurors to pose questions to witnesses is
inconsistent with our adversarial system." Judge Maloney noted that the
primary function of the jury is truth determination, but also acknowledged
that, at times, due process and other individual rights override the truthfinding function. 45 Allowing questions by the jury increases the chances that
jurors will form conclusions or settle on a particular legal theory before having an opportunity to hear all evidence and to be instructed by the judge on
the law of the case.4 6 Judge Maloney concluded that, because any benefits
from permitting jury questioning are far outweighed by their costs, such
practice will not be allowed.47 Judge Maloney noted further that judicial
implementation of procedural safeguards would be ineffective to eliminate
any dangers from the process. 48 Absent a clear mandate from the legislature, no attempts to allow this practice should be made by the judiciary.4 9
Judge Miller joined in the opinion, but specifically noted that the legislature is free to enact a criminal procedure for allowing jury questioning. 50
Judge Clinton reviewed past cases in Texas and determined that there is
no indication that jury questioning is the preferred procedure and, in fact,
there is substantial evidence that the practice is specifically rejected. 5
He
further determined that there is no authorization of jury questioning "by any
source of hierarchical governance." 52 Judge Clinton reviewed relevant law
review articles on the subject and concluded there is a lack of proof that jury
questioning enhances jury truth determination.53 The judge condemned the
practice after noting that there is potential, as exemplified by Morrison, for
54
jury questioning to aid in the conviction of criminal defendants.
Judge Campbell wrote a dissenting opinion disagreeing with the majority's
arguments that trial courts do not have the power to allow jurors' questions
and that the dangers of such a procedure are outweighed by the benefits.5 5
The judge cited Article 5, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution as authority
granting Texas trial courts the discretion to allow jury questioning.5 6 By
referring to studies and practices in other jurisdictions, Judge Campbell also
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Morrison v. State, 845 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
Id.
Id. at 887.
Id. at 887-88.
Morrison, 845 S.W.2d at 887-88.
Id. at 889.

50. Id.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 889-90.
Morrison, 845 S.W.2d at 892.
Id.
Id. at 894-95.
Id. at 900.
Morrison, 845 S.W.2d at 900.
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countered the majority's assertion that the inherent dangers allowing jury
questioning cannot be circumvented by procedural safeguards.

7

Judge

Campbell outlined a procedure to test the validity of allowing jurors to question witnesses. 5" Assuming this procedure is followed and there is no positive legislation preventing such a practice, Judge Campbell asserted that a
juror's questioning of a witness is within a trial judge's discretion because
such a practice enhances the fair and efficient administration of justice.59 In
fact, he implied that a trial judge must allow jury questioning, absent legislative prohibition.'
Judge Benavides, in a dissenting opinion, stressed the benefits of allowing
jury questioning. 6' After acknowledging the trepidation that many courts
have with permitting jurors to question witnesses and recognizing Texas's
fierce aversion to disrupting the adversarial system, Judge Benavides felt that
benefits from such a procedure outweigh any dangers to the adversarial system, 62 particularly when an adversarial process is applied to the questioning. 63 After determining that the question in the instant case was neutral
and no core values of the adversary system were affirmatively undermined,
Judge Benavides stated that the jury's question was not reversible error.6
An analysis of the Court's opinion reveals that the case was erroneously
decided. The concurring justices' assertion that there is no "authoriz[ation]
[in Texas] by any source in the order of hierarchical governance" for the
practice of jury questioning is correct only to the point of exact authorization. The concurring opinions, as well as the majority opinion, fail to discuss
Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 102, which provides: "These rules shall be
construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined., 65 The Texas Legislature authorized the adoption of the Texas
Rules of Criminal Evidence.6 6 Rule 102 specifically grants the judiciary the
power to experiment with the Texas Rules of Evidence. 67 Therefore, it
seems apparent that, contrary to the assertions made in the concurring opin57. Id. at 901.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 902.
60. Morrison, 845 S.W.2d at 902.
61. Id.

62. Id. at 903-04.
63. Id. at 905.
64. Morrison, 845 S.W.2d at 905-06.
65. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 102 (emphasis added).
66. See Act of Aug. 26, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 685, § 5, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 2472,
2473 (current version at TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.109(a)-(b) (Vernon 1988)) (adopting
Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence).
67. TEX. R. CRIM EvID. 102. Rule 102 provides: "These rules shall be construed to
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ions, there has been authorization by "a source in the order of hierarchical
governance" to develop and advance the rules of evidence in Texas, just as
the trial court attempted to do in Morrison. Furthermore, it seems that,
absent legislation condemning jury questioning, trial courts should be free to
allow such a practice.
Even without Texas Criminal Rule 102, there is implicit authorization in
the Texas Constitution68 and the Texas Rules of Evidence69 for the juryquestioning procedure.7 ° Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 610(a)(1) & (2)
provides: "The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and
order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make
the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the
truth, [and] (2) avoid needless consumption of time.... ,71 Jury questioning
72
has generally been recognized as more effective in ascertaining the truth
and, in the long run, in saving time at trial.73 This theory, that a trial court

secure [the] ... promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." Id. (emphasis added).
68. See TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 1 (defining powers of Texas judges). Article 5, Section 1
gives judges the power (1) to receive evidence; (2) to decide the issues of fact raised by the
proceedings; (3) to decide the relevant questions of law; (4) to enter a final judgment on the
facts and law; and (5) to execute the final judgment and sentencing. Id. Included in these
powers are all powers reasonable and necessary for their execution. State v. Johnson, 821
S.W.2d 609, 612-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Therefore, it appears that a trial court may allow
jury questioning if determined to be reasonable and necessary to discover the truth. Furthermore, it seems apparent that the judiciary, contrary to the Morrison majority opinion assessment, may allow such a procedure without specific legislative authorization.
69. See Buchanan v. State, 807 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991)
(stating that jury questioning is authorized in the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence), vacated,
1993 WL 37428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Allen v. State, 807 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1991) (stating that jury questioning is consistent with general rule that
trial judge may control examination of witnesses), rev'd, 1993 WL 13192 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993).
70. See Buchanan, 807 S.W.2d at 645 (finding authorization for jury questioning in Texas
Rules of Criminal Evidence); Allen, 807 S.W.2d at 641 (finding that TEX. R. CRIM. EVID.
610(a) grants trial court discretion to allow jury questioning).
71. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 610(a)(l)-(2).
72. See United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
826 (1979) (finding that jury questioning makes "good common sense"). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated:
There is nothing improper about the practice of allowing occasional questions from jurors
to be asked of witnesses. If a juror is unclear as to a point in the proof, it makes good
common sense to allow a question to be asked about it. If nothing else, the question
should alert trial counsel that a particular factual issue may need more extensive development. Trials exist to develop the truth.
Id.
73. See Michael J. Wulser, Should Jurors Be Allowed To Ask Witnesses Questions in Criminal Trials?, 58 UMKC L. REV. 445, 454 (1990) (stating that allowing jurors to question
witnesses could speed up deliberation time as jurors would not have to consider unclear evi-
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has discretion to allow jurors to question witnesses, has been adopted in federal courts7 4 and in every other state.7 5 By allowing jurors to submit questions for witnesses, Texas would simply be accepting a practice that has been
adopted by all federal courts and the vast majority of state courts.
The majority opinion in Morrisonjustified its departure from the norm by
contending that the inherent dangers of jury questioning outweigh the benefits of the procedure. However, the majority's concerns about the effects 7of6
jury questioning were not confirmed by field tests of the practice.
Although participating judges and attorneys entered these tests with many
of the same worries expressed by the Morrison court,77 the results of the tests
show that such fears are groundless. Although only some of the perceived
benefits of jury questioning were confirmed in the test, 78 none of the perdentiary points). In fact, studies show that juries voted for acquittal on the first jury ballot
more often in cases when they were allowed to ask witnesses questions. Larry Heuer & Steven
Penrod, Increasing Jurors' Participation in Trials, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 238 (1988).
74. E.g., DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516 (4th Cir. 1985);
Callahan, 588 F.2d at 1086; United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d 580, 588 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Talanker v. United States, 348 U.S. 887 (1954).
75. See Allen, 807 S.W.2d at 640-41 (finding that all other jurisdictions that address issue
have adopted jury questioning); see also Jeffrey S. Berkowitz, Note, Breaking the Silence:
Should Jurors Be Allowed To Question Witnesses During Trial?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 117, 128
(1991) (stating that only Georgia has rejected jury questioning). Georgia has only rejected
direct questioning of witnesses by juries, not indirect questioning by written questions. See
Storey v. State, 278 S.E.2d 97, 98 (Ga. App. 1979) (approving of jurors' asking indirect questions to witnesses).
76. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Jurors' Participation in Trials, 12 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 231, 257-58 (1988) (discussing conclusions of their experiment with jury questioning). The study concluded by confirming the perceived advantages of jury questioning:
providing feedback to attorneys and alleviating juror doubts about evidence. Id. at 258. There
was no confirmation of increased satisfaction or the uncovering of important evidence. Id.
None of the perceived disadvantages--delaying the trial, upsetting attorney strategy, annoying
the trial process, fostering reluctance of counsel to object, embarrassing or angering the jurywas confirmed. Id.
77. See id. at 237-38 (1988) (listing perceived disadvantages, which the study was examining). The perceived disadvantages to jury questioning, which the field test was attempting to
measure, were: 1) jury questioning might upset the speed or decorum of the trial; 2) jury
questioning might cause jurors to lose objectivity by becoming over-involved (the "twelve angry men syndrome"); 3) jury questioning might upset trial strategy; 4) the procedure might be
too cumbersome; 5) inappropriate questions might be asked, which could lead to problems
with attorneys' objections. Id.
78. See id. at 237-38 (1988) (discussing findings of perceived advantages, which the study
was examining). The test confirmed that jury questioning did alleviate jurors' doubts about
evidence and did provide attorneys with useful feedback about what issues need further clarification. Id. at 257-58. However, the test was unable to confirm that jury questioning increased
juror satisfaction with the judicial system or that it uncovered important evidence. Id. It
should be noted, however, that several times jurors have uncovered important evidence that
might have otherwise been omitted. See Morrison v. State, 815 S.W.2d 766, 766-67 (Tex.
App.-Waco 199 1) (questioning by jury revealed issue of self-defense), afl'd, 1992 WL 367513
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ceived dangers were confirmed.7 9 The field-test results support the following

assertions:
1. With the appropriate procedure for allowing jury questioning, any
compromise of the adversarial system can be effectively minimized. 0
2. The benefits of allowing jury questioning outweigh any dangers
posed by such questions."'
None of the opinions in Morrison adequately discusses the attorney-jury
communication that occurred in the case. Allowing jury questioning provides a more effective two-way communication between the attorney and the
jury.8 2 This communication provides an indication as to what evidentiary
point the jury does not understand or believe.8 3 This is of critical importance to an attorney. A problem may arise, as in Morrison, when the jury

question can be perceived as an impermissible communication.

4

However,

(Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see also Jeffrey S. Berkowitz, Note, Breaking the Silence: Should
Jurors Be Allowed To Question Witnesses During Trial?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 117, 118 (1991)
(describing important evidence elicited by jury questioning at trial).
79. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 257-58 (1988) (concluding that no disadvantages to jury questioning were supported by test results).
80. See id. at 257-58 (concluding that test results revealed no disadvantages, while some
advantages were confirmed). The tester gave the following instructions for jury questioning:
In this trial, we request that you allow the jurors to direct written questions to any witness. After direct and cross examination of each witness is complete, please ask jurors to
submit any additional questions they may have, in writing, to you. If you find any such
questions patently objectionable, decline to ask it and explain to the jury that no adverse
inference should be drawn from your ruling. If the question is facially acceptable, confer
with counsel and rule on any objection (outside the hearing of the jury) raised before
posing the question to the witness. If an objection is sustained, explain to the jury that no
adverse inference should be drawn from your ruling.
Id. at 240. This procedure resulted in a system that produced no confirmable disadvantages
from jury questioning. See id. at 257-58 (discussing findings of study).
81. See id. at 257-58 (listing findings of test on jury questioning). By finding that some of
the perceived advantages to jury questioning were confirmed and no disadvantages could be
confirmed, there is apparent support to say that the benefits of jury questioning outweigh any
costs.
82. See Jeffrey S. Berkowitz, Breaking the Silence: Should Jurors Be Allowed To Question
Witnesses During Trial?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 117, 119 (1991) (describing benefits of two-way
communication between attorney and jury); Michael J. Wulser, Should Jurors Be Allowed To
Ask Witnesses Questions in Criminal Trials?, 58 UMKC L. REV. 445, 452 (1990) (stating that
unless messages are very simple, one-way communication usually is ineffective).
83. See Brian Wice, There's Nothing Wrong with Juror Questioning, TEX. LAWYER, Feb.
22, 1993, at 18 (analogizing to students who attempt to improve their understanding by asking
teachers questions). One must also realize that juror questioning can be equally as beneficial to
the defense, as the prosecution.
84. See Morrison, 815 S.W.2d at 768-69 (finding that juror's question "tipped off" prosecution and was impermissible communication between attorney and jury). In Morrison, the
court stated that the jury's inadmissible question signaled the prosecution that the jury was
concerned with a self-defense issue. Id. at 769. This was deemed no different than the jury's
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a judge's control over the procedure should effectively eliminate any such
communication. 85
The Court of Criminal Appeals incorrectly decided Morrison. The court's
attempts to justify the condemnation of jury questioning have been rejected
universally by all other American courts, effectively countered in commentary, and unsubstantiated by field tests. Furthermore, the court's prohibition of jury questioning is contrary to the grant of power that the Texas
Legislature, at a minimum, implied a trial court could exercise. The court's
prohibition disallows an effective procedure. This prohibition could further
burden Texas trial courts' attempts to explore other potentially beneficial
courtroom procedures.
Mark C. Roberts II

asking the prosecution to "[p]lease prove whose blood was in the hall." Id. Because such a
request would be impermissible, the court found that there was an impermissible communication between the prosecution and the jury. Id.
85. See Morrison, 815 S.W.2d at 768-69 (refusing to rule jury questioning impermissible
even after finding abuse of discretion in allowing communication between jury and attorney).
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